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THE PLACE AND USES OF JURISPRUDENCE
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
JEROME HALL*

S

TATISTICALLY, at least, the jurisprudence Round Table was the
outstanding success of the 1948 annual meeting. The auditors
burst the bounds of the Round Table room and almost filled the General Assembly room, to which the conference was transferred. It was
a surprising, indeed a startling, occurrence. And I do not believe I exaggerate when I say there was much gratification among teachers who
had struggled many years to win a place for jurisprudence in the law
school curriculum.
Given the statistical fact, one may interpret its meaning according
to any hypothesis which will survive critical scrutiny. My interpretation is that it has become widely recognized (1) that jurisprudence occupies a place of unique importance in legal education, if, indeed, it
is not the foundation of the entire legal curriculum; (2) that jurisprudence is useful-it increases the resourcefulness of lawyers in their
daily efforts to solve the more difficult legal problems; and (3) that
in the present-day world, jurisprudence is essential to the sound solution
of national and international problems; hence no more important contribution can be made by the law schools than the jurisprudential education of the bar. If these interpretations are not the mere preferences
of a devotee but, instead, represent sober, accurate reports of a fundamental change in the attitude of legal educators, the implications are
no less than momentous.
A brief glance at the history of teaching jurisprudence underlines
the significance of the recent development. We ought, first, to
note and give due weight to the fact that the education of Jefferson
and his contemporaries included the study of "moral and political
* Professor of Law, Indiana University Law School.
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philosophy" at the same time the courses in positive law were studied;
and that this stands out in sharp contrast to the recent past, when,
until about a decade ago, jurisprudence was taught in only a few
law schools. Except for two or three seminars, especially those of
Pound and Patterson, and Cook's lectures on scientific method, the
typical course was a narrow, traditional one, usually on analytical jurisprudence, with Holland or Salmond providing the text.
About a decade ago, several important changes occurred. The textbook was largely abandoned; instead, and well before the impact of
the Great Books movement, original source materials selected from the
texts of the legal philosophers were read. The field expanded from
analytical jurisprudence to include the philosophy and the sociology
of law. The course was increasingly offered in law school curricula.
Indeed, in a goodly number of schools, although the courses are
designated in diverse ways, jurisprudence is taught in introductory,
as well as in later, courses; and in a few schools seminars in jurisprudence have been added to the regular course. Thus, at Harvard
a course in jurisprudence has been added to the seminar. At Indiana,
a seminar has been added to the course. The like expansion has occurred in other schools, although there is a surprising omission of
jurisprudence in the new, required three-year curriculum at Chicago
(except for the Introduction). Finally, it is evident that jurisprudence
has permeated and influenced the teaching of many courses, i.e.,
many scholars who do not teach the jurisprudence course are, in
effect, legal philosophers who utilize a specific subject matter to illustrate and illuminate general theories. It is difficult to measure
this effect of jurisprudence on the teaching of the various courses,
but it does not seem rash to assert that it is perhaps the most important
of all the changes ushered in by the renaissance of jurisprudence in
the recent past. In this expansion of jurisprudence in the law school
curriculum, the most important single step was that taken at Columbia
several years ago when the course in jurisprudence, given by two of
the ablest members of the faculty, was required of all third-year
students. (If I am not mistaken, it is the only third-year required
course.) Whether one approves the requirement or not, the significance
of the Columbia position cannot be underestimated. Representing
the considered view of a brilliant and practical-minded faculty, the
Columbia provision must command careful consideration. It represents the high-water mark of recognition of the importance of jurisprudence in the equipment of the modern lawyer. Although there is
a goodly basis for some satisfaction with the situation in an increasing
number of schools, it remains true that many law schools still offer no
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work in jurisprudence and even the best schools offer only two courses,
a "regular course" and a seminar.
In my opinion, the next. objective should be enough work in
jurisprudence to occupy the full time of one member of the faculty or,
perhaps better, of half the time of two or three teachers, i.e., ten to
twelve semester hours in the field. This is not the place to support such
a proposal in detail, but two or three grounds may be briefly noted.
The creation of such a chair or chairs in each law faculty would establish the legal philosopher as an equally important member of the
concern, with various beneficent results. For example, a minority
of young scholars could be trained to fill such positions. They might
add a Ph.D. in philosophy to the law degree and, in any event, the
official acceptance of legal philosophers in all law faculties would
be a spur to specialized preparation for such positions. The prospect
of founding and successfully conducting an American Journal of
jurisprudence would be greatly increased and this, itself, is surely
a worthy objective. Again, such a program in the law schools
would attract the favorable notice of the philosophy and social science
departments, with resulting interchange of students and other cooperation. But the final and most decisive test must, of course, be the
value of a knowledge of jurisprudence-its value to practicing lawyers
and to the community and country they serve.
Specialization in the three-year curriculum is usually discountenanced
because the student cannot predict the particular branch of law which.
will be his future vocation and because a general legal foundation is
considered essential. The student does know, however, that he will
be a citizen of a democratic society, and jurisprudence is obviously important in the fundamental education. Hence, the question which the
law schools should seriously consider is whether concentration in
jurisprudence to the extent above indicated is warranted under present conditions. Without any wish to indulge in sentiment or rhetoric,
I must say that in my opinion no more serious question confronts
the law schools. We have some inkling of the kind of world we shall
live in for an indefinite future. And it can be predicted confidently
that a bar composed of 170,000 legal philosophers would make a
vast difference-perhaps all the difference necessary to preserve and
expand democratic society. I do not pursue the matter further because I believe the blight of extreme vocationalism so sears law school
thinking that what I urge will be quickly dismissed as impracticable.
The law schools have already abdicated much of their proper sphere
of influence; and I should not be surprised to see them reduced finally
and flatly to technical training schools, with citizenship, statesmanship,
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scientific research, and leadership wholly allocated to other divisions
of the university. Certainly it is inertia rather than resourcefulness or
imagination on the part of the law schools that still allows them some
participation in the pursuit of these broader objectives. The problem
is obviously not an easy one, 1 and, .since judgment in these matters is
largely formed by the past, one must expect opposition to any proposed
marked expansion of courses in jurisprudence. Yet expansion there
has been during the past decade. This should persuade legal educators
to encourage the teaching of jurisprudence even though they do not commit themselves to any proposed program of great expansion of that
subject.
The progress of instruction in jurisprudence in the past decade has
led to the use of various pedagogical methods-discussion, lecture,
question and answer, reports by students with quizzing by the class
and comments by the instructor, seminars, and even research. It is
impossible to elevate any particular method of instruction above all the
others, especially in the teaching of jurisprudence, in view of the fact
that various combinations of circumstances influence individual decisions in the matter.
Certain questions, however, may profitably be raised with regard to
the discussion method and the lecture method. Law teachers are apt
to prefer a discussion method and perhaps, simultaneously, they are
apt to discount the lecture method, and for obvious reasons. But the
fact that the discussion method is superior in most law courses by no
means demonstrates its superiority in a jurisprudence course. No
doubt it is easier to carry on a conversation than to prepare two or
three thoughtful lectures each week and present them in a stimulating
manner. It is also much more difficult to conduct a discussion of
jurisprudential issues which will accomplish what can be done by a
good lecture. Moreover, the experience of some teachers, at least,
is that during the first part of the course, e.g., the first third of it,
most law school students require a distinctive orientatdon if they are
to read jurisprudence intelligently. Their discussions in the first weeks
are apt to be hollow, curbstone reactions. The inculcated reliance on
authority must give way to reliance on more subtle uses of the understanding. Well-prepared lectures, supplemented by answers to specific
questions, facilitate the transition, give the students some solid foundation on which to stand, and prepare for entrance into a second stage
of the course where discussion is more encouraged because it can then be
relatively informed. In the hands of some teachers, these objectives
1 Cf. The writer's essay, Toward a. Liberal Legal Edueation, 30 IowA L. llzv. 304

(1945).
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may be attainable by discussion, interspersed with short comments
(lectures?), but the likelihood is that this is the more time-consuming
way even if it does not discourage the better students who have had
some training in philosophy and are unhappy when they are long subjected to the superficial discussion of their classmates. After some
weeks of stimulating, informative lecturing, paralleling but not summarizing the materials read, the entire class has been provided not only
with a set of common ideas but also with some fair apprehension of
an attitude toward, and a method of studying, jurisprudence. I do
not mean to assert that there is any one "best way" of teaching jurisprudence for all instructors, classes, and conditions. The principal
intent in these remarks is to challenge what I regard as a bit of law
school mythology regarding the lecture method. In a course like jurisprudence, where, as Professor Patterson put it in his discussion at the
Round Table, a knowledge of the most important ideas of jurisprudential thought is a major objectiVe, the le6ture can be of the utmost
importance.
There is a related point which deserves mention, namely, the tendency in law schools, if I am not greatly mistaken, to "talk down" to
the students, especially if discussion is the only method used. In many
courses, it may be defensible to conduct the discussion within the intellectual limits of the large majority, and allow the best and the worst
to shift for themselves. In jurisprudence, however, it seems to me
that there is a particularly impelling challenge to stimulate thinking
by appealing suggestively to the higher ranges of understanding and
imagination. The majority learn even if they miss the nicer points
of the discussion or lecture; the ablest minority (say 25 per cent)
keep interested; and all are encouraged to develop their speculative,
intuitive powers. Of course, this does not mean that a vast array of
names, "schools," and recondite information must be emphasized. It
means thorough analysis of jurisprudential ideas, an absence of authoritative determination, and a cultivation of the speculative mind.
It is better, I think, to have the average student of jurisprudence occasionally puzzled, even mystified, than to simplify and present an a,b,c
account of legal philosophy.
It is possible greatly to increase the significance of the major jurisprudential ideas and to avoid a sterile history of legal philosophy if
the instructor parallels the materials with apt lectures and comments
which represent his own viewpoint. What I have in mind was very
well stated by Professor Max Radin, a member of the Council of
the Jurisprudence Round Table, in a letter commenting on the selected
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subject.* I take the liberty of bringing his remarks to the attention of
law teachers generally. Mr. Radin wrote:
What I have in mind is something like the following. Every person
wo teaches a course in Jurisprudence should develop a theory of his
own. He will not have to be a profound philosopher or thinker to be
capable of acquiring one. However he acquires it, by deep and protracted study or by hasty improvisation, he should get one. It need not be
original, but it should be his.
He may, if he likes, obediently and reverently follow in the steps of
a Matter, but if he does he should omit saying anything about that fact
except possibly at the beginning or the end of his course. It makes no
difference who the Master is. It may be Hegel (whom God curse I) or
Kant (upon whose name be prayer and peace!) and there is no reason
why it may not be some thoroughly modern and American like Llewellyn
or Dewey or anybody else. And it may well be an eclectic arrangement
of doctrines into a more or less consistent pattern, or at least, a consciously inconsistent pattern. But the main thing is that the person
teaching Jurisprudence should work out his theory and present the Law
to his students in relation to it.
In aid of future Councils of the Jurisprudence Round Table, it
may be well to record the opinion expressed at the meeting that future Councils should feel no compulsion to confine the program to the
pedagogical aspects of jurisprudence. The present situation is this:
the Jurisprudence Round Table meets every other year, and its programs have been rather largely restricted to the teaching of jurisprudence. One has only to compare this situation with the facts in many
foreign countries to see immediately that the state of the legal philosopher in the United States is a very sorry one. Elsewhere there
are societies of legal, or social and legal, philosophy, two or three annual meetings, much discussion of major problems, collaboration,
communication, publication in journals devoted to legal philosophy,
etc. We can and, in my opinion, we ought to make definite beginnings
in those directions in this country. We are almost required to start
with the Jurisprudence Round Table; but we can meet annually and
we can free the discussions from the limitations of pedagogical aspects
of jurisprudence, although, of course, we may occasionally wish to
discuss that problem. These are specific, feasible objectives which can
be attained in short order if the teachers of jurisprudence wish to
achieve them.
The following papers, which were the principal addresses presented
at the Round Table, are excellent illustrations of the wealth of suggestive thought which it is the particular province of jurisprudence
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to contribute to the curriculum. The papers speak for themselves.
Professor Fuller, as usual, has something important to say and he says
it in a felicitous style, addressing himself very specifically to immediate questions. On the other hand, Dr. Northrop, uninhibited by
years of insistence on sticking to the material "operative" facts, takes
a very broad view of the subject. I would not presume to relate Dr.
Northrop's thesis to immediate problems of legal education, though
one may hope that he will give us the benefit of his further attention
to that question on a somewhat lower level of abstraction. In any
event, I am persuaded that legal philosophy and education in this
country can profit greatly from Dr. Northrop's far-flung challenge.
Let me note a specific fact or two in support of this assertion.
The work of the Committee on a Twentieth Century Legal Philosophy Series has brought the committee and the Association into contact with the legal philosophers of many foreign countries. Everywhere there is great interest in the work being done in this country;
there is a strong desire for closer association, collaboration, and
greater mutual understanding. This sometimes takes the form of specific proposals; e.g., only recently an official in the Ministry of
Justice of Portugal extended an invitation to American legal philosophers, through the committee, to submit their writing for translation and publication in Portuguese journals; the same request was
made by the Kuratorium of the revived Archiv fur Rechts-undSozialphilosophie. Similar evidence could be adduced-evidence of
the implications and responsibilities of this country's central position in
world affairs, and that its legal scholarship is proportionately significant.
What needs particular emphasis is that jurisprudence is free from the
limitations of positive law. Within its ample boundaries the American
scholar can communicate with the legal philosophers of all the other nations. This is a unique place in the curriculum where we can nurture a
branch of universal culture whose significance cannot be exaggerated.

